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Emotion and Group Cohesion in Productive
Exchange1
Edward J. Lawler
Cornell University
Shane R. Thye
University of South Carolina
Jeongkoo Yoon
Ajou University
This study refines and experimentally tests a theory of relational
cohesion that explains how and when actors become committed to
one another in the context of multiactor exchange. The theory asserts
that frequent social exchange results in (1) positive emotions that
solidify and strengthen the person-to-group bond and (2) uncertainty
reduction that renders the focal group more salient in relation to
others. These two mechanisms produce a sense of psychological
group formation and ultimately increase observable acts of com-
mitment. In a “productive exchange” setting, three actors negotiate
a joint venture that requires the assent of all members. The ex-
changes featured two forms of commitment behavior: the giving of
small token gifts and the decision to invest in a three-way prisoner’s
dilemma. The results suggest that positive emotion and uncertainty
reduction are theoretically distinct and affect commitment behavior
through different mechanisms. The article concludes by discussing
the general implications for commitment and social order.
INTRODUCTION
Social exchange is inherently a joint activity in which two or more actors
attempt to produce a flow of benefits better than they can achieve alone
1 This research was funded by the National Science Foundation (SBR-9514860). Earlier
versions of this article were presented at the 1998 American Sociological Association
meeting in San Francisco and at the 1999 Pacific Sociological Association meetings in
Portland. The authors thank Marty Kuhn for his programming skills and Wes Sine
for help with the data collection. We thank several AJS reviewers for helpful comments.
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or in other relationships. The jointness of the task varies across forms or
types of social exchange, as does the underlying interdependency among
the actors (Thibaut and Kelley 1959; Blau 1964). To the degree that social
exchanges recur among the same actors, the properties of jointness and
interdependence should promote the development of relationships or
groups. One explanation for this is uncertainty reduction (Cook and Em-
erson 1984; Kollock 1994), another is positive emotion (Lawler and Yoon
1993, 1996, 1998). These two processes are more or less robust across
various types of social exchange, and in a larger sense, they are key
foundations for solidarity and social order. In this article, we examine a
neglected form of social exchange, productive exchange, and test the role
of uncertainty reduction and emotional/affective processes in the develop-
ment of person-to-group commitments. We take person-to-group com-
mitment or attachment as a reflection of emergent group formation (Tajfel
and Turner 1979, 1986; Rabbie and Horowitz 1988; Kramer 1993; Parsons
1951).
Productive exchange is based on mutual interdependencies that are
strong enough to make joint action or collaboration the most profitable
option to individual actors. Examples include neighbors deciding to ar-
range for the landscaping of a common area, universities agreeing to
develop a joint distance-learning program, corporations negotiating their
respective contributions to a joint lobbying effort directed at a state leg-
islature, or several unions developing a common approach to negotiations
with a city government. In each case, two or more actors can produce a
joint good by contributing their individual resources or talents to the
collective endeavor. In productive exchange, there are strong incentives
for exchange, and the main question is whether the actors can coordinate
their actions to forge agreements.
Productive exchange is one of four fundamental forms of social
exchange identified by exchange theorists (Emerson 1972, 1981; Molm
1994; Molm and Cook 1995); the other basic forms include negotiated,
reciprocal, and generalized exchange. Negotiated exchange involves ex-
plicit and binding agreements, about actor-to-actor flows of benefit, made
at a single point in time. Reciprocal exchange involves sequences of uni-
lateral giving among two actors over time. The common thread here is
that both kinds of exchange are inherently dyadic, that is, each involves
“direct” transactions between two actors. Generalized exchange is a uni-
lateral form of exchange in which givers and receivers are not matched
in pairs, that is, A gives to B who gives to C who gives to A. Productive
The order of authorship was determined alphabetically and does not reflect differential
contributions. Direct correspondence to Edward J. Lawler, School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853.
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exchange is indirect and generalized in the sense that it entails a person-
to-group and group-to-person exchange. Molm (1994) aptly terms this a
“group cooperation” subtype of exchange, while Yamagishi and Cook
(1993) describe it as “group generalized exchange.” 2
Productive exchange is the most group-oriented form of exchange (Em-
erson 1972, 1976, 1981; Yamagishi and Cook 1993; Molm 1994; Molm
and Cook 1995). It is also the least studied. Exchange theorists tend to
use the term productive exchange in somewhat variable ways (see Em-
erson 1972; Molm 1994; Molm and Cook 1995), so our first task is to
sharpen the concept. We define productive exchange in terms of four
properties as follows.
First, productive exchange involves two or more individuals who gen-
erate a single, socially produced object or event. The rewards from pro-
ductive exchange may be divisible (as when three corporations jointly
generate a profit) or indivisible (as when three colleagues author a man-
uscript), but in either case, there is a single source of profit that all share
in some way (Emerson 1972, 1981). Of special importance is the relation
between the actor and group: the flow of contributions are from person
to group, and the flow of rewards are from group to person. Productive
exchange can occur in dyads or larger groups, but the prototype of pro-
ductive exchange involves three or more actors, because in such groups
the person-to-group feature is more easily separable from person-to-person
attachments. In dyadic productive exchange, the person-to-group bond is
more wrapped up with the person-to-person bond.
Second, compared to the other forms of exchange mentioned above,
productive exchange involves higher degrees of interdependence, that is,
joint control over outcomes (Molm 1994). This is manifest in the fact that
(1) the potential profits from a productive exchange are greater than any
other option actors have, and (2) successful exchange requires the assent
of all group members. Noncooperation by any single individual is suffi-
cient to prevent the exchange from transpiring.3 Exchange theorists since
2 In direct exchange (negotiated or reciprocal), each actor provides valued benefits to
the other, yet no additional value is produced by their joint acts, A giving to B and
B giving to A. In productive exchange, the combination of these benefits is greater
than the sum of the individual benefits, e.g., group benefit 1 A 1 B. If A and B are
scholars, direct exchanges might involve each providing comments on the other’s
papers; productive exchange might involve joint work, such as a coauthored paper in
which each brings different talents or expertise. Direct exchange produces benefits for
each, whereas productive exchange produces a joint good.
3 It should be noted that free riding is not relevant here. Free riding would be an issue
in productive exchange if (1) the good is public and therefore accessible to parties who
are not a part of the collaboration, or (2) the parties to the productive-exchange agree-
ment can abrogate the agreement afterward, i.e., not fulfill its terms. In our research,
the joint goods are under control of the parties to productive exchange, and the
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Thibaut and Kelley (1959) have recognized interdependence as a central
property of exchange, and recent theorizing of exchange structures (Molm
1994; Molm and Cook 1995) has identified important structural variations
in interdependence that make productive exchange stand out as the most
cooperative.
Third, productive exchange occurs in a context that poses significant
coordination problems. These make it difficult for actors to realize their
mutual interests despite incentives to do so.4 The coordination problems
can be due to limited communication because of the number of individuals
involved, or because of the constraints on the exchange process. For ex-
ample, in negotiated exchange coordination problems occur if the offers
made by multiple partners are simultaneous rather than sequential;
whereas in reciprocal exchange long delays between the unilateral benefit
flows would generate coordination problems. In this research, we use a
multiactor, person-to-group negotiation context to create the necessary
coordination problems.
Fourth, in productive exchange, each actor makes a single demand or
claim from a single pool of rewards produced at the group level. For
example, a corporation may ask for a certain percent of the revenue
generated by a four-way consortium or a high school may ask for a certain
level of access to a jointly developed practice field. A single pool of group-
generated resources distinguishes productive exchange from “inclusively”
or “positively” connected relations where payoffs stem from multiple pools
at the dyadic level (see Patton and Willer 1990; Willer 1999; Emerson
1981). If the product of productive exchange is divisible, as in the above
examples, decisions about whether to engage in a collaborative effort also
entail decisions about how benefits are to be shared.
It is the combination of the above four properties that give productive
exchange its distinctive character. Productive exchange is a group-
oriented, coordination task in which actors seek to produce a valued result
through their joint collaboration. Productive exchange can involve a ne-
gotiated or reciprocal form of person-to-group, group-to-person exchange.
For example, three actors could be negotiating the division of profits from
a mutual fund, or each could be giving monetary contributions to the
group without a specified future return. In the former, where the benefits
from productive exchange are negotiated, there is less uncertainty about
exchange agreements are binding. We impose these particular conditions experimen-
tally, but the concept of productive exchange also applies to conditions where free
riding is possible.
4 Theoretically, if coordination problems of some sort did not exist, the mutual interests
and incentives favoring exchange would lead actors to reach an accommodation easily.
See Schelling (1960) for a related discussion of coordination problems in contexts with
strong incentives for cooperation.
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the contingencies of reward because agreements are explicit and binding
(Molm 1994).
We address two theoretical questions in this research. First, under what
conditions will productive exchange among three actors generate a sense
of groupness and cohesion among them? Second, what role do emotions
and feelings play in this cohesion process, and how does this compare to
traditional exchange-theoretic explanations that center on uncertainty re-
duction? We assert that group cohesion, defined as the perception of the
group as a unifying force or object, is an important part of the commitment
process. Higher group cohesion should cause members to remain in the
group despite valued alternatives, engage in symbolic or token gestures
that signify the group border, initiate new ventures involving risk, and
avoid exercising power against other group members. Such behaviors
indicate actors have formed a person-to-group tie and, through this, have
developed a commitment to the group and its members.
Parsons (1951) drew a sharp distinction between person-to-person and
person-to-group attachments, arguing that the latter are crucial to social
order because individuals are limited in the number of social relations
they can or will maintain. Even in relatively small groups, each dyadic
relation will not necessarily form or be equally strong. Groups, as such,
endure by having common foci, experiences, and identities above and
beyond interpersonal ties among actors (Brewer 1993; Collins 1981). The
importance of person-to-group ties is further evidenced in the organiza-
tional commitment literature (Kanter 1968, 1972; Hall 1988; Lincoln and
Kalleberg 1985; Lawler 1992a) and in psychological analyses of social
identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Hogg and Turner 1985; Rabbie and
Horowitz 1988). In social-identity terms, “psychological group formation”
is a powerful unifying force among a set of interdependent actors (see
also Berger and Luckmann 1967, pp. 57–60; Collins 1989). Applied to the
forms of exchange, productive exchange should be especially conducive
to person-to-group ties.
Productive exchange is prone to such attachments because, in the ab-
stract, joint social activities generate positive emotions or feelings. We
certainly are not the first to recognize this connection. The same point
was central to Durkheim’s (1915) analysis of ritual behavior as detailed
in his Elementary Forms of Religious Life, and has been used extensively
by Collins (1981, 1989) in his theory of interaction ritual chains. Collins
postulates that joint activity produces a common focus, a sense of group
affiliation, and an emotional uplift associated with the group interaction.
Applied to productive exchange, this common focus should heighten the
degree to which reaching agreements will produce an “emotional
buzz”—feeling good, elated, energized; whereas failing to reach agree-
ments will produce an “emotional down”—feeling bad, disappointed, de-
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pressed. Lawler and Yoon (1996, 1998) have developed and tested a theory
of relational cohesion that explicates this process for negotiated exchange
among dyads in a network. Now we aim to theorize and test whether
productive social exchange among multiple actors promotes cognitive or
psychological group formation through comparable emotional processes.
BACKGROUND
Social exchange theory has focused on contexts where two or more actors
seek to arrive at a satisfactory exchange of benefits. It is generally assumed
that individuals exchange for instrumental reasons. In the parlance of
exchange theory, successful exchange is a rewarding or reinforcing event,
while failed exchange is a costly or punishing event. Exchange theory
presumes that people exchange repeatedly with the same actors when
success occurs but move to others when failure occurs. The underlying
theoretical mechanism here may be either operant conditioning (Homans
1961; Emerson 1972) or rational choice (Kollock 1994; Cook and Whit-
meyer 1992; Macy 1993).
The standard exchange-theory explanation for commitment is that fre-
quent exchange reduces uncertainty. When actors repeatedly exchange
resources, they should learn more about one another, find each other more
predictable, and infer that they have similar orientations to the exchange
task. Predictability, expectation confirmation, and the like can be consid-
ered a benefit of staying with the same actor (Emerson 1981; Molm 1994;
Molm and Cook 1995). Research in cognitive psychology supports the
notion that individuals tend to avoid unpredictable or uncertain decision
contexts (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
1996). More recently, the uncertainty-reduction hypothesis has been af-
firmed by Kollock (1994) who shows that commitment is more likely to
form in spot markets, where the quality of the products bought are un-
knowable. A simple way to characterize this point of view is shown in
figure 1.
This same theme emerges in a variety of other commitment explana-
tions, ranging from those centered on trust (Pruitt and Kimmel 1977;
Yamagishi 1995) or relation-specific assets (Williamson 1981) to those
dealing with embeddedness within larger social units (Granovetter 1973,
1985). Taken as a whole, these theories generally concur that reduced
uncertainty sets focal relations or groups apart from others and increases
their instrumental value to actors.
We adopt a somewhat different approach, starting with the premise
that commitment in dyads and larger groups may grow from expressive,
as well as instrumental, foundations (Parsons 1951). We argue that with
Fig. 1.—The uncertainty reduction explanation for commitment
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repetitive exchange, groups and relations become salient social objects
that have a cognitive or subjective reality to actors. As such, these relations
or groups may take on objective value and become ends in themselves
(Berger and Luckmann 1967; Collins 1989; Lawler and Yoon 1996).
Within exchange theories, the expressive character of group formation is
translated into instrumental language and thus loses independent theo-
retical status (see Lawler and Thye [1999] for further discussion). Our
focus on the expressive underpinnings of commitment extends and com-
plements the traditional social exchange approach based on instrumental
behavior.
The instrumental foundation assumed by exchange theorists makes
microsocial orders, in the form of social relations and groups, tenuous and
unstable. One might imagine social life as a grand spot market in which
ties do form, but they have difficulty enduring in the context of competitive
bidding, free rider problems, and changing incentives in the environment
(Frank 1988, 1993). Microsocial orders—that is, stable networks of re-
lations or groups—are problematic because of the uncertainties and risks
involved in forming enduring or lasting social bonds or connections (e.g.,
Molm 1994; Frank 1988). Several solutions have been proposed for social
order problems of this nature, especially in the rational choice and social
dilemma literatures (e.g., Hardin 1968; Hechter 1987; Macy 1993; Ya-
magishi 1995), and exchange theorists have imported many of these ideas
into their theorizing about networks (Yamagishi and Cook 1993; Molm
1994; Lawler and Yoon 1996). Because many exchanges occur in the
context of environmental uncertainty, the majority of the solutions are
directed at conditions that reduce risk and uncertainty (Molm and Cook
1995).
Lawler and Yoon (1996) put forth an alternative explanation for com-
mitment, one based on the emotional/affective processes exchange tends
to induce. This approach is based on the notion that success at exchange
makes people feel good, while failure makes them feel bad (see Willer,
Lovaglia, and Markovsky [1997] for evidence; see Gillmore [1987] for
potential qualifications). The “theory of relational cohesion” contends that
individually felt emotions unleash a cognitive process through which the
emotion is attributed in part to the relations or groups that constitute the
context for exchange. In this manner, groups can become objects of in-
trinsic value to actors due to the positive emotions generated from
exchange. As such, the social order problems inherent in uncertain or
unpredictable relations are not as problematic. This theoretical argument
is captured in figure 2.
Thus, there are two exchange-theoretic explanations for commitment,
an emotional/affective one and an uncertainty reduction one. Uncertainty
reduction emphasizes the instrumental side of exchange while the emo-
Fig. 2.—The emotional explanation for commitment
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tional/affective mechanism stresses the expressive. In the current research,
we seek to determine if uncertainty reduction predicts person-to-group
commitment in a productive exchange context and to assess if the emo-
tional/affective processes observed previously adds explanatory power.
Affirmative answers to these questions would verify two independent
mechanisms through which actors become committed to each other in
productive exchange.5
In addition, this research extends the theory of relational cohesion be-
yond the dyad by investigating the commitment processes in multiactor
(i.e., triadic) exchange. The move from dyads to triads has important
theoretical implications for exchange if combined with a productive
exchange structure. For instance, in triads, compared to dyads, each actor
has to predict and anticipate the behavior of two others instead of one,
which makes it even more difficult for actors to coordinate their behaviors.
Because there also is more uncertainty about reaching agreement, suc-
cessful exchanges are likely to be perceived as a more significant accom-
plishment. Thus, in a multiactor productive exchange context, repeated
exchange should have stronger effects on the perceived predictability of
the others, and successful transactions should produce even stronger pos-
itive emotions. We investigate a three-actor productive exchange because
this is the simplest case of multiactor productive exchange wherein person-
to-group ties are distinct from the interpersonal bonds (Simmel 1950;
Berger and Luckmann 1967).6
THE THEORY
The central idea of our theorizing and research is that social exchange
has emotional effects on actors, and if these are attributed to social units,
the social unit takes on expressive value or intrinsic worth. Persons de-
velop stronger ties to groups that are perceived as a source of positive
feeling or emotion and weaker ties to those perceived as a source of
negative feelings or emotion. These ties are instrumental to the degree
they reflect the benefits of mutually satisfactory exchange; they are ex-
pressive to the degree the social unit is an object of affective attachment.
5 One might argue that these two mechanisms are intertwined: a reduction of uncer-
tainty could enhance positive feelings, or positive feelings may generate a greater sense
of predictability. Relational cohesion theory assumes these are parallel processes, pro-
duced by a common cause, i.e., repetitive exchange, and there is some evidence for
this (see Lawler and Yoon 1996). Our measurement procedures and empirical test
isolate these mechanisms accordingly.
6 Simmel (1950) argues that triads are the smallest group in which people begin to
perceive the force, presence, or reality of a social unit external to themselves.
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The theory of relational cohesion shows how emotions generate such
affective attachments (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). In this article, by
incorporating uncertainty reduction as a distinct pathway to commitment
and group formation, we broaden the theory and make it possible to
address both instrumental and expressive consequences of repetitive
exchange and structural power dependence conditions.
The theory contains three foundational ideas. First, network structures
shape who is likely to interact and exchange with whom, by providing
incentives for actors to exchange with some and not others (Skvoretz and
Lovaglia 1995). The same actors are likely to exchange with each other
across time under fixed structural conditions. Second, successful exchange
efforts produce an emotional buzz, that is, mild, positive feelings; while
failure to accomplish exchange generates mild negative feelings (Lovaglia
1997; Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The emotions of concern here are
involuntary internal events that simply “happen to people” (Hochschild
1983).7 Third, actors are motivated to understand the sources of these
feelings because they want to reproduce good feelings and avoid bad
feelings in the future. Yet, the source of these feelings is unclear, given
that exchange entails a joint accomplishment. This presents actors with
an attribution problem (see Weiner [1985] for a relevant theory). The result
is “cognitive work” by individuals, in which social units—exchange re-
lations or groups—are a part of their explanation for the emotions felt.
In productive exchange, then, groups become objects of attachment to
the degree that they are perceived as a source of positive individual feel-
ings. Cohesion and commitment behavior are consequences of this.
In figure 3, we offer a modified theory of relational cohesion that in-
corporates the effect of uncertainty. The appendix contains a formaliza-
tion. The exogenous, endogenous, and dependent variables are discussed
in turn below.
The exogenous conditions are the structural relations of power depen-
dence or interdependence among the actors (Emerson 1981; Molm 1994).
Power is defined as the structural capability for some actors to extract
resources from others as determined by levels of dependence. Power ca-
pability is distinct from power use (tactics or strategies) and the actual
or realized power manifest in the division of payoffs (Emerson 1972,
Bacharach and Lawler 1981; Lawler 1992b; Molm 1987). Adapting Em-
erson’s concept of dependence to a group of multiple actors sharpens the
7 An emotion is defined as a relatively short-lived positive or negative evaluative state
that involves neurophysiological, neuromuscular, and sometimes cognitive elements
(Kemper 1978; Izard 1977).
Fig. 3.—The revised theory of relational cohesion
American Journal of Sociology
628
distinction between person-to-person and person-to-group dependencies.8
Assuming a set of actors in a group, each actor’s dependence on the group
is equal to the maximum benefit from the focal group versus the maximum
benefit from an alternative group. The total or mutual interdependence
in the group refers to the average of each members’ individual dependence
on the group. Dependence equality/inequality refers to the relative dif-
ferences between members’ dependence on the group (see the appendix,
below, for formal definitions). In this research, we experimentally cross
low versus high total (average) dependence on the group with equal versus
unequal dependence on the group.
The theory predicts that greater total dependence and equal versus
unequal dependence will produce more frequent exchange in the focal
group. Higher total dependence increases the opportunity costs of opting
for an alternative group affiliation; it also gives members more flexibility
to adapt and more room for misperception or miscalculation. This is
because there is a larger range of agreements that meet a “sufficiency”
criterion, that is, provide each actor more than the expected value from
the alternative group. The negative impact of dependence inequality re-
flects the fact that inequalities of power will raise issues of fairness and
legitimacy that are likely to be absent under equal dependence (Molm
1990; Brines and Joyner 1999). The interaction effect indicates that the
combination of high total and equal dependence on the group should
produce an extra structural push toward repetitive exchange and the
resulting group formation (i.e., commitment) process.
The theory posits an indirect sequence by which structural power de-
pendence conditions promote group formation. In fact, the endogenous
process is the heart of the theory. It starts with the exchange frequencies
produced by the structure of dependence. One endogenous path operates
through the uncertainty reduction effects of exchange frequency, and the
second endogenous path operates through the emotional/affective effects
of exchange frequency. These two processes converge in that each en-
hances perceptions that the group is a unifying or cohesive unit (see also
Bollen and Hoyle 1990). The theory assumes that these effects are distinct,
analytically and empirically. Our prediction is that the two paths represent
different, but complementary, explanations for how group formation
emerges out of social exchange processes.
8 One of the most important insights of Emerson’s power dependence theory is that
power dependence relations are nonzero sum. This means that the average or total
dependence in a relation can vary independently of the relative or equality/inequality
of power. Bacharach and Lawler (1981), Molm (1987), and Lawler and Yoon (1996)
have further developed this idea. A nonzero sum concept is particularly important for
productive exchange because a key property of this form of exchange is mutual
interdependence.
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The main dependent variables are commitment behaviors, two forms
of which are investigated here: token gifts provided to others unilaterally
and without strings or contingencies, and willingness to contribute to a
new joint venture.9 Token gifts in this research lack instrumental value
and are symbolic of a shared group affiliation; the new joint venture takes
the form of a N-person social dilemma where noncontributing is the dom-
inant strategy and the well-known disparity between individual and col-
lective rationality is present (Platt 1973; Axelrod 1984). Gift giving can
be construed as more expressive than contribution behavior, while con-
tribution behavior is more instrumental than gift giving. These behaviors
are observed after actors have had the opportunity to establish a sense
of group through frequent or repetitive exchange. Previous tests of re-
lational cohesion theory have found the predicted effects on these forms
of commitment behavior in a negotiated exchange context (see Lawler
and Yoon 1993, 1996; Lawler et al. 1995).
The two endogenous paths can be construed as capturing different
facets of group formation. Uncertainty reduction is a boundary-defining
process by which actors come to see the group as set off from other
relations or groups. This occurs because of the risks associated with less
predictable relations and groups. Research in psychology generally in-
dicates that actors avoid risking the loss of highly probable benefits, like
those anticipated from predictable exchange (Tversky and Kahneman
1981). This preference should shift the orientation of actors toward more
predictable exchange relations, making them a salient object of awareness.
In this manner, predictable relations may come to have “distinctiveness”
in social identity terms (Brewer 1993) as they are cognitively set off from
others.
The emotional effects of exchange can be interpreted as a social bonding
process through which the group becomes an object of intrinsic or ex-
pressive value. This occurs because actors perceive the group context as
partly responsible for their positive feelings, suggesting the “valuation”
dimension of group formation that is sometimes referred to as “group
status” (Brewer 1993) or “group value” (Tyler 1990, 1994). It is now gen-
erally accepted that group distinctiveness and group valuation are primary
sources of psychological group formation, along with common fate and
mutual interdependence (Kramer and Brewer 1984; Rabbie and Horowitz
9 Commitment is defined as the attachment of an individual to a relation, group,
organization, or some other social unit (Kanter 1968). There are various behavioral
forms this might take. A standard form is continuing exchange with the same others
(stay behavior); others we have included are unilateral gift giving and investing in a
new venture (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998). We focus on gifts and investment
in a social dilemma for theoretical reasons, but we also analyze the continuance form
of commitment behavior.
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1988; Kramer 1991, 1993). Thus, the main ingredients for psychological
group formation are embedded in the productive form of exchange (in-
terdependence and common fate) and manifest in the theoretical model
we test (group distinctiveness and group evaluation). If a salient group
boundary and person-to-group bonding are bases for group-oriented com-
mitment in productive exchange, we should observe two separate but
converging endogenous processes through which actors develop collective
orientations and become willing to act with reference to the group.
To summarize, the theory predicts that greater interdependence and
equality of dependence on the group promotes person-to-group commit-
ments, indirectly and endogenously, through the following steps: (1) High
interdependence and equal dependence generate more frequent exchange
among actors. (2) More frequent exchange among these actors increases
(a) positive emotions or feelings and (b) the perceived predictability of the
others. (3) Positive emotions and perceptions of predictability each make
the relation more salient as a unifying, cohesive object in the situation.
(4) Greater perceived cohesion produces more commitment to group, as
reflected in unilateral gift giving among members and inclinations to
undertake new collaborations that involve risk or the potential for mal-
feasance. The theoretical model specifies a series of interconnected bi-
variate hypotheses shown in figure 3.
METHOD
The Productive Exchange Context
Several features of the experimental setting were designed to create a
productive exchange context as conceptualized in the introduction. First,
three actors were deciding whether to engage in a collaborative effort
that was likely to produce more profits than they could achieve alone or
in any other group available to them. The instructions explained that this
profit was produced from a three-way research and development project
that required the assent of all three actors. Second, coordination problems
existed because actors did not exchange offers and counteroffers directly
with the others, as in a negotiated exchange setting, but instead made
claims on a pool of group-generated resources. The claims were made
simultaneously and independently, which enhanced the coordination
problems. Third, subjects in this new setting were deciding whether to
participate in a collaborative venture, which is the person-to-group pro-
duction of benefit, and what to claim in return for their participation,
which is the group-to-person distribution of benefit. The procedures of
the research adapted the dyadic negotiated exchange procedures of Lawler
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and Yoon (1993, 1996) to establish a three-person, productive exchange
context.
The theory was tested with two distinct experiments, each tied to a
different form of commitment behavior. The first experiment investigated
the tendency to give small token gifts; the second focused on contribution
behavior in an N-person social dilemma. In keeping with our theoretical
scope, both experiments involved three subjects who repeatedly could
negotiate a productive exchange under conditions of varying power and
dependence. Their negotiation task was to allocate profits from a collab-
orative effort.
Design and Subjects
Each experiment employed the same 2 # 2 factorial design, manipulating
dependence inequality (equal vs. unequal) and total dependence (high vs.
low). Subjects were undergraduate students at a large eastern university
who signed up in courses as paid volunteers. A total of 384 subjects
participated in the two experiments. In each experiment, 64 same-sex
triads (32 female, 32 male) were randomly assigned to one of four ex-
perimental conditions (16 triads per cell; 192 subjects per experiment).
Procedures
Upon their arrival, subjects were ushered into separate cubicles where
they received written instructions. These explained that each person in
the study would represent one of three research organizations—termed
alpha, beta, and gamma. Each of the organizations purportedly developed
highly specialized computer chips for sale to larger corporations. The
instructions indicated that because of an increasingly competitive and
uncertain market situation, each company must rely on joint research and
development with other organizations to develop a competitive product.
The cover story further explained that the three organizations have as-
sembled the capital and talent to consider a joint venture of this type.
Each subject was told that their task in the study was to negotiate for a
share of the profits produced by the joint venture.
The subjects were told the study would simulate up to 20 negotiation
episodes, defined as “years.” The experiments actually ended after the
sixteenth episode (year) to preclude “end effects.” The instructions ex-
plained that because of changing market conditions, the profit divisions
from the joint venture must be negotiated anew each year. In the event
the three representatives could not reach an agreement, each could auto-
matically secure an agreement with an alternative group where the profit
was likely to be somewhat lower. Each representative had information
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only on the profits they earned given an agreement, a condition that is
consistent with related work (Lawler and Bacharach 1987; Lawler and
Yoon 1993, 1996). Subjects’ pay depended on the agreements they reached
with one another or with an alternative organization. When the experi-
ment was complete, the assistant explained the nature of the research,
answered questions, and paid the subjects using a standard formula that
converted profit points to money.
The negotiations involved each actor claiming a portion of the profit
from the joint venture. These claims were lodged simultaneously, so none
knew the claims currently being made by the others. The instructions
indicated that the total profit the three companies would produce was
1,625 points per year. The subjects were to negotiate on behalf of their
organization in an effort to receive as much of the total profit as they
possibly could.
The actual bargaining took place via microcomputers connected to each
other from separate cubicles. Each episode (year) consisted of a maximum
of five bargaining rounds. In turn, each round consisted of a single claim
(from the 1,625 points) by each person. To make a claim, each person
simply indicated (in multiples of 25) how many profit units their organ-
ization wished to claim. For any given round, the subjects could repeat
their previous claim or make a concession by lowering their claim. They
could not retract earlier concessions, that is, subjects could not raise their
claims. An agreement occurred when the sum of the three claims were
equal to or less than the joint profit (e.g., 1,625). The negotiation continued
until an agreement was reached or until the end of the fifth round, which-
ever came first. If an agreement was not reached by round 5, each rep-
resentative earned zero points from the focal group and was awarded an
agreement with their simulated alternative group. This alternative payoff
involved a random drawing, with the likelihood of different profits being
based on a probability distribution that was used to manipulate relative
and total levels of power dependence.
Experimental Manipulations
We manipulated structural power by varying the probability of various
payoffs from the alternative group (see Lawler and Bacharach 1987; Law-
ler and Yoon 1993, 1996). The total power of actors was manipulated by
varying the average quality (expected value) of alternatives across the
three subjects. In the low total power condition, the average expected
payoff of the three actors from the given alternatives was 350 points,
while in the high total power condition their expected payoff from their
alternatives was 200 points. Power inequality was manipulated by varying
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the relative quality (expected value) of the three subjects’ alternatives to
the focal group.
In the high total and equal power condition, all subjects had alternatives
worth the same expected value (200 points), as indicated above, and the
same probability distribution. Specifically, from their alternative group,
all three subjects had a 5% chance of 250 points, 15% chance of 225
points, 60% chance of 200 points, 15% chance of 175 points, and 5%
chance of 150 points. In the low total and equal power condition, each
subject had an alternative with an expected payoff of 350 points, as
indicated above, and a probability distribution as follows: a 5% chance
of 400 points, 15% chance of 375 points, 60% chance of 350 points, 15%
chance of 325 points, and 5% chance of 300 points.
Under unequal relative power combined with high total power, the
high power subject had an alternative with an expected value of 350
points (i.e., a 5% chance of 400 points, 15% chance of 375 points, 60%
chance of 350 points, 15% chance of 325 points, and 5% chance of 300
points); the subject at the middle level of power had an alternative with
an expected value of 200 points (i.e., a 5% chance of 250 points, 15%
chance of 225 points, 60% chance of 200 points, 15% chance of 175 points,
and 5% chance of 150 points); and the least powerful subject had an
alternative with an expected value of 50 points (i.e., a 5% chance of 100
points, 15% chance of 75 points, 60% chance of 50 points, 15% chance
of 25 points, and 5% chance of 0 points). Under unequal dependence
combined with low total dependence, a constant of 150 points was added
to each point along the probability curve. This yielded expected values
of 500, 350, and 200 points for the high, middle, and low power actors,
respectively.10
10 Following Emerson’s (1972, 1981) power dependence theory, we see power as related
to levels of dependence on the group. The more dependent a given actor, the less
powerful. In turn, each actor’s dependence (DA, DB, and DG) is the difference between
the maximum potential payoffs in the group (i.e., 1625/3 p 542 points) and individual
member’s expected value of alternative. In the low total power and unequal power
condition described above, each actor’s dependence is 342 (i.e., 542 2 200 p 342),
192 (i.e., 542 2 350 p 192), and 42 (i.e., 542 2 500 p 42). The total dependence in
this condition is the average of the three members’ dependence on the group (i.e., 576/
3 p 192). Note that total dependence here is the same as the total dependence in the
equal relative, low total power condition (i.e., [192 1 192 1 192]/3 p 193). Relative
power is defined in terms in dependence inequality, the average difference of each
member’s dependence (i.e., [F DA 2 DB F 1 F DB 2 DG F 1F DG 2 DA F] / 3). For
example, dependence inequality in the low total and unequal power condition is 200
(i.e., [F342 2 192F 1 F192 2 42F 1 F42 2 342F] / 3 p 200), which is also the same
as dependence inequality in the high total and unequal power condition (i.e., [F492 2
342F 1 F342 2 192F 1 F192 2 492F] / 3 p 200).
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Dependent Measures
Both forms of commitment behavior (gift giving and investment) were
measured at the triadic level. Subjects had the option to give small token
gifts to one another (experiment 1) or contribute some of their individual
resources into a single joint venture that is shared by all (experiment 2).
These options were made available at the beginning of the thirteenth
episode (year). Additional instructions were given to subjects following
the twelfth episode to explain the options.
Gift behavior (experiment 1).—In the first experiment, commitment was
measured by the propensity for the individuals to give one another gift
vouchers. The gifts in this study were token (that is, worth very little
monetarily), unilateral (given without knowing whether the other would
reciprocate), and noncontingent (there was no clear reason for subjects to
expect the others would reciprocate). In short, the gifts were more ex-
pressive than instrumental or strategic.11
Beginning at the end of episode 13 and continuing through the end of
episode 16, each subject could provide gifts to one or both of the other
representatives. The instructions explained: “The gift option is an chance
to express how you feel about your relationship with the other two mem-
bers . . . whether or not you decide to give a gift is completely up to you
and the gift vouchers you do not give become yours to keep.” Two gift
vouchers were given to the subjects at the close of negotiation for each
gift episode. The subjects could then give these gifts to the other repre-
sentatives or keep them for themselves by pressing the appropriate key
on their keyboard. Subjects did not find out if others gave them gifts until
the end of all negotiations, at which time the experimenter exchanged a
piece of candy for each gift voucher held by each subject. This was to
ensure that subjects did not treat gifts as an explicit part of the focal
exchange. We use the ratio of gift giving frequency over the total number
of possible gifts during the last four episodes to index the aggregate level
of gift giving. This measure could range from 0 to 1 (mean p .32; SD p
.14).
Contribution behavior (experiment 2).—In the second experiment, com-
mitment was measured by the tendency to invest in a new joint venture
that involved considerable risk and the potential for malfeasance. As noted
above, this joint venture took the form of a N-person prisoner’s dilemma
game. Beginning at the end of episode 13 and continuing through episode
11 Heath (1975) contrasts three forms of gift giving: presents, favors, and donations.
Presents are a symbol of a positive, friendly relationship, favors provide a service to
another, whereas donations are directed at a goal shared by the giver and receiver.
Gifts in our experiments are “presents” in Heath’s (1975) terms. They are small, token
gestures that symbolically put forth a definition of the relationship.
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16, subjects had the option of investing 200 points into a joint account
co-owned by the three actors. This account would generate profit returns
at 50% on the investment, and these would be divided equally among
the three companies. All three had to contribute in order to generate the
individual returns on investment. The individual earnings from the in-
vestment option were not reported to the subjects until the end of the
experiment, which ensured that subjects could not determine how often
others used the investment option. The individual earnings from the in-
vestment option were added to those from the productive exchange.12
In game-theoretic terms, this measure constitutes a decomposed pris-
oner’s dilemma game (Rapoport and Chammah 1965) with the important
difference that subjects did not know whether the others had contributed
until the experiment was completed. Again, we calculated the ratio of
actual contributions over the total number of possible contributions across
episodes 13–16 to create an index of contribution behavior. This index
could range from 0 to 1 (mean p .36; SD p .21).
Common Variables
Several measures were common across the two experiments. Our software
tracks the frequency of agreement and profit difference for each experi-
mental session.13 We also administered a computerized questionnaire to
measure positive emotion, predictability, and group cohesion. All common
variables were indexed to form a triadic score, for which larger numbers
indicate a higher level on the variable. Exchange frequency is inherently
triadic, while positive emotion, predictability, and group cohesion are
defined as the average of the individual scores. We address each measure
in turn.
Exchange frequency.—The measure of exchange frequency is the pro-
portion of negotiation episodes for which a given triad of actors reaches
an agreement. We focus on the rate of agreement across the first 12 ep-
12 If no one contributed to the joint account, then all three actors received no net gain
for that year. In the event one member contributed and two did not, the 200 points
invested turned into 300 points, which was then divided equally among the actors
(i.e., the contributor lost 100 points and the two noncontributors each earned a net
profit of 100 points). If two members contributed to the joint account, the contributors
each earned a net profit of 0 points and the noncontributor earned a net profit of 200
points. Finally, if all three members contributed, each earned a net profit of 100 points
(i.e., the 600 points invested becomes 900 to be divided equally between the three
actors).
13 The theory of relational cohesion makes no predictions for profit differences, and
prior research has clearly shown the effect of exchange frequency is independent of
profit differences (Lawler and Yoon 1996). As such, our analysis will focus on the effect
exchange frequency has on the commitment process.
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isodes of negotiation, primarily because this phase represents the period
during which the endogenous processes stipulated by the theory should
develop. The average proportion of agreement across the first 12 episodes
was slightly less than half (mean p .42; SD p .19).
Positive emotions.—Subjects reported their feelings about the negoti-
ations along a series of nine-point bipolar adjectives after episodes 6 and
12. The items and measures were previously developed by Lawler and
associates (1993, 1995) using factor analytic techniques. These measures
were later validated by confirmatory factor analyses in comparable re-
search (Lawler and Yoon 1996, 1998). The items and measures used in
the current research are virtually identical to those used previously (Law-
ler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998). The pleasure/satisfaction index consisted
of self-report evaluations on four items: pleased/displeased, happy/
unhappy, satisfied/not satisfied, and contented/discontented (for all triads,
mean p 4.2 and 5.2; SD p 1.13 and 1.34; and Cronbach’s a p .95 and
.97; respectively, at episodes 6 and 12). The interest/excitement index
summed the following four items: interesting/not interesting, exciting/
boring, enthusiastic/unenthusiastic, and motivating/unmotivating (mean
p 6.0 and 6.1; SD p .87 and .99; and Cronbach’s a p .86 and .92;
respectively, at episodes 6 and 12).
Predictability.—After episodes 6 and 12, subjects were asked to char-
acterize their negotiations with the others. We created a predictability
index by summing the subjects self-reported perceptions on the following
four items: predictable/unpredictable, certain/uncertain, clear/vague, and
stable/fluctuating (mean p 5.95 and 6.24; SD p .87 and .90; and Cron-
bach’s a p .77 and .84; respectively, at episodes 6 and 12).
Group cohesion.—This measure, reported after episodes 6 and 12, was
a simple extension of the relational cohesion measure used in previous
dyadic studies (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). In that research, confirm-
atory factor analysis indicated that the relational-cohesion index was
highly reliable and empirically distinct from the measures of emotion.
Subjects were asked to describe their relationships with each of the others
along a series of bipolar adjectives. The index included the following
items: close/distant, coming together/coming apart, solid/fragile, and co-
hesive/divisive (mean p 4.40 and 5.01; SD p .96 and 1.15; and Cron-
bach’s a p .86 and .92; respectively, at episodes 6 and 12).
RESULTS
The theory specifies a priori a causal model that entails a sequence of
steps, through which conditions of structural power indirectly lead to
commitment behavior (see fig. 3). Based on the theory, the experimental
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methods and procedures impose the appropriate temporal order among
the variables. Standardized experimental procedures, along with the ran-
domization of groups to experimental conditions, establishes the controls
that make possible causal inferences.
The theory makes strong claims about what empirical links will be
found, that is, predicting effects only for theoretically contiguous variables.
Our purpose is to test whether these are the primary or only links among
variables in the model. If there are positive direct effects between steps
(variables) that are not contiguous, for example, between total dependence
and emotion or between emotion and commitment, revisions are needed
in the theory to account for these additional paths.
We use linear structural equation modeling (Jo¨reskog and So¨rbom 1993)
to examine the overall fit of our measurement and theoretical model, and
then we estimate the parameters associated with each theoretical path to
determine if the hypothesized processes operate as predicted. This tech-
nique affords three primary advantages. First, the causal and the mea-
surement models are specified such that the two are simultaneously es-
timated. The behavioral measures (exchange frequency, gift giving,
investment) are single-indicator rates or proportions, whereas question-
naire measures (predictability, positive emotion, cohesion) are multiple-
indicator measures. The use of Lisrel allows us to take advantage of
multiple indicators to correct for attenuation in the path estimates due to
random measurement error (see Thye 2000). Second, to be consistent with
theory and research on emotions (i.e., Russel 1980), we created a hypo-
thetical second-order construct, termed positive emotion, with two sub-
dimensions—interest/excitement and pleasure/satisfaction. Third, to cor-
rect for potential biases caused by unmeasured factors that share variance
with predictability and positive emotion, the error terms of these con-
structs are allowed to be correlated with one another. This permits an
unbiased estimate of effects from each construct to relational cohesion.
The presentation of the analysis is divided into four parts. First, we
use confirmatory factor analysis to test the four-factor model assumed for
the questionnaire indices: pleasure/satisfaction, interest/excitement, pre-
dictability, and cohesion. Second, we test the model up through group
cohesion, combining data from both experiments since they are identical
until episode 13 when subjects begin the commitment phase. Third, sep-
arate analyses for the two commitment behaviors (i.e., gift giving and
contributing to a new venture) are conducted. Fourth, the data from these
experiments are compared to the dyadic data collected in a previous
negotiated exchange study (Lawler and Yoon 1996).
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TABLE 1
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results
Measurement Model x2 df GFI AGFI LTI CFI RMSEA
Independent model . . . . . . 2,035 120
One-factor model
{PR1GC1PS1IE} . . . . 810 104 .52 .37 .59 .63 .23
Two-factor model
{PR1PS1IE}{GC} . . . . . 634 103 .59 .46 .68 .72 .20
Two-factor model
{PS1IE1GC}{PR} . . . . . 642 103 .58 .44 .67 .72 .20
Three-factor model
{PR}{GC}{PS1IE} . . . . . 462 101 .67 .55 .78 .81 .17
Four-factor model
{PR}{GC}{PS}{IE} . . . . . . 152 98 .88 .84 .97 .97 .06
Note.—GFI, AGFI, LTI, CFI, RMSEA refer to goodness-of-fit index, adjusted goodness-of-fit index,
Lewis-Tucker goodness-of-fit index, comparative fit index, and root mean square error of approximation,
respectively; also PR, GC, PS, and IE refer to predictability, group cohesion, pleasure/satisfaction, and
interest/excitement. All x2 and factor loading values are statistically significant at P ! .001; N p 128.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis
Table 1 contains the results of a confirmatory factor analysis. The theory
posits a four-factor model by distinguishing the two self-reported emo-
tions, perceived predictability, and perceptions of group cohesion. The-
oretically, the main alternative to this model is a three-factor model in
which the two emotions (pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement) are
combined. A number of other specifications are logically possible but less
likely given the distinctiveness of these constructs in past research (Lawler
and Yoon 1996, 1998). Table 1 contains results for the most plausible
models, given our theory and past research. There is strong support for
the four-factor model. In fact, only the four-factor model reaches goodness-
of-fit levels that are consistently high across the various fit measures (GFI
p .88; AGFI p .84; LTI p .97; CFI p .97; RMSEA p .06). Thus, there
is clear empirical support for key conceptual distinctions made by the
theory. Having demonstrated the distinctiveness of the theoretical con-
structs, we next test for both endogenous processes simultaneously.14
14 All of the items loaded significantly on hypothesized factors (see also Lawler and
Yoon 1993, 1996, and 1998). An examination of the cross-loadings and measurement
errors did not show any abnormal patterns, suggesting the measurements are valid.
For pleasure/satisfaction, the item factor loadings are .92, .95, .97, and .96 respectively
for pleased/displeased, unhappy/happy, unsatisfied/satisfied, and discontented/
contented. For interest/excitement, the loadings were .83, .86, .92, and .86 respectively
for not interesting/interesting, boring/exciting, unenthusiastic/enthusiastic, and un-
motivating/motivating. For predictability, they were .74, .89, .63, and .78 respectively
for unpredictable/predictable, uncertain/certain, vague/clear, and fluctuating/stable. Fi-
nally, the loadings for group cohesion were .84, .89, .86, and .89 for distance/close,
coming apart/coming together, fragile/solid, and divisive/cohesive.
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Group Cohesion Model
Figure 4 contains the standardized Lisrel coefficients for the indirect paths
hypothesized from structural power-to-group cohesion. In this and sub-
sequent analyses, the exogenous power-dependence conditions are dummy
variables and both emotions (pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excite-
ment) are treated as indicators of the broader second-order construct,
positive emotion. As indicated before, the path and measurement models
were estimated simultaneously. We examine each prediction of the theory
in the appropriate sequence below.
Power Dependence and Exchange Frequencies
The hypotheses linking power to exchange frequency were supported (see
table 2). The results as seen in figure 4 indicate that higher total or mutual
dependence on the group increased the frequency of exchange (b p .33;
P ! .01), and equal compared to unequal power has a comparable positive
effect (b p .21; P ! .05). These findings are consistent with the predictions
and with past research (see Lawler and Yoon 1996). There is also a sig-
nificant interaction effect (b p 2.27; P ! .05), which suggests that the
lowest frequency of exchange was when power was unequal and mutual
dependence was low.15
It is important to note that these results suggest that the awareness of
power dependence conditions, other than one’s own, is unnecessary for
the predicted structural-power effects on exchange frequency. The reason
is that subjects in this research did not have full information about the
power (alternative) conditions. Each person knows that all individuals
have an alternative, but they do not have details about the nature of this
alternative, which they did have in previous research on dyadic negotiated
exchange (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998). Thus, we affirm a point
made by early research on exchange networks (Cook et al. 1983)—namely,
that structural power effects are present even when actors are unaware
of their comparative power positions.
15 The pattern of interaction indicates that under low total power conditions, subjects
in the equal power condition reached more agreements than those in the unequal
power condition (.42 vs. .35). However, there was a nonsignificant trend in the opposite
direction within the high total power conditions (.43 vs. .46). This interaction effect
has not been evident in four previous experiments with dyads, so it is not clear whether
this effect is unique to triadic productive exchange or a function of the limited infor-
mation concerning the alternative payoff available to other negotiators. The presence
of the theoretically posited main effects is sufficient for our purposes here—namely,
to test the core of the theory that explains how exchange frequencies alter the com-
mitment process.
Fig. 4.—Results from the original model. *P ! .05; **P ! .01; ***P ! .001.
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Test of Endogenous Process
Exchange frequency, positive emotion, and predictability.—Next, we
test for the first step in the endogenous process, that is, the predicted
positive effects of exchange frequency on positive emotion (i.e., pleasure/
satisfaction and interest/excitement) and on the perceived predictability
of the negotiations. The results reveal strong support for the central pre-
dictions of relational cohesion theory. Table 2 (second and third columns)
shows that when actors successfully exchange more frequently, they ex-
perience stronger positive feelings (b p .58; P ! .001); in addition, they
perceive more predictability in negotiations with the focal group (b p
.24; P ! .01). When pleasure/satisfaction and interest/excitement are an-
alyzed separately, we find stronger effects for pleasure/satisfaction (b p
.58; P ! .001) than interest/excitement (b p .32; P ! .001), but exchange
frequency significantly affects both.16 Overall, the results for exchange
frequency support the first “moment” or step in the parallel endogenous
processes.
Group cohesion.—The hypothesized effects of emotion and predict-
ability on perceived group cohesion are a critical part of the endogenous
process, where group formation on a cognitive level is most likely to be
located. Results for the emotion-to-cohesion link strongly affirm the hy-
pothesis (b p .78; P ! .001), but results for the predictability-to-cohesion
link do not (b p .06; NS). Thus, we find clear evidence for the emotional/
affective mechanism but no evidence for the uncertainty-reduction mech-
anism. These findings support the original version of relational cohesion
theory (Lawler and Yoon 1996) and demonstrate the independence of the
emotional/affective process and the uncertainty reduction process favored
by most exchange theorists. The implication is that the emotional/affective
mechanism is more important to the emergence of a “collective sense” at
the relational or group level.
To further examine this, we included an indicator of subjective group
value, that is, a set of bipolar adjectives measuring the degree that the
group was valuable/not valuable, precious/not precious, and significant/
insignificant (Cronbach’s a p .91). We conducted an analysis that pre-
dicted subjective group value from the variables in the endogenous pro-
cess, that is, from agreement frequency, positive emotion, predictability,
and cohesion. The results indicate that perceived cohesion has the largest
effect on subjective group value, controlling for all other variables in the
theoretical model (b p .76; P ! .001). We also analyzed a single item on
16 The stronger effect of pleasure/satisfaction can also be inferred indirectly from the
second-order confirmatory factor structure. The second-order confirmatory factor anal-
ysis shows that the factor loading from positive emotion to pleasure satisfaction is .96,
while that from positive emotion to interest/excitement is .53.
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TABLE 2
Standardized Lisrel Estimates of the Causal Paths in the
Theoretical Model: Triads
Independent AF PE PR GC Gift Investment
High total power (HT) . . . . . . . .33** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equal power (EQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . .21* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agreement frequency (AF) . . . . . . .58*** .24** . . . . . . . . .
Positive emotion (PE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 *** . . . . . .
Predictability (PR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 . . . . . .
Group cohesion (GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45*** .12
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 .34 .06 .65 .20 .01
x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306.60
Note.—N p 128. For x2, P p .00; df p 200. Goodness of fit p .84; Lewis-Tucker fit index p .94;
comparative fit index p .95.
* P ! .05, one-tailed tests.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
the poststudy questionnaire that asked subjects to what extent the three
of them “belonged to the same group.” Again, controlling for all other
variables in the model, greater perceived cohesion significantly increased
the sense of being part of the same group (b p .34; P ! .01). Thus, the
endogenous process does generate a sense of groupness. The results for
perceived value and perceived groupness add further weight to the un-
derlying assumptions and logic of the theory.
To summarize, results for the endogenous process support key elements
of the theory of relational cohesion. There is strong support for the idea
that frequent productive exchange unleashes an emotional affective pro-
cess that generates a sense of groupness (cohesion). Frequent exchange
produces positive emotions, which in turn, produce greater perceived co-
hesion. Moreover, the results demonstrate that this emotional/affective
process is independent of and, in fact, stronger than the uncertainty re-
duction process. Frequent exchanges reduced uncertainty, as expected,
but our research suggests that emotions are the primary foundation for
group formation. This does not imply that we have refuted the uncertainty
reduction explanation for commitment proposed by Kollock (1994) and
others (Cook and Emerson 1984). Rather, it suggests that uncertainty
reduction does not operate through the group formation process specified
here. Momentarily, we pursue an alternative process for uncertainty
reduction.
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Commitment Behavior
The final theoretical link connects perceived cohesion to behavioral acts
of commitment. The results (fig. 4 and table 2) indicate that group cohesion
increases the rate of unilateral gift giving among the actors as predicted
by the theory (b p .45; P ! .001). However, in the case of actors’ propensity
to invest in a new joint venture, there is a weak effect in the right direction
(b p .12), but it does not reach statistical significance (P ! .11). The failure
to find a significant effect contrasts with previous work on dyadic
exchange, which observed cohesion-to-commitment effects on a range of
commitment-type indicators including stay, gift giving, and investment
behaviors.
To determine whether this departure is unique to our measure of in-
vestment in a social dilemma, we examined the proportion of agreements
between rounds 13 and 16 as a proxy for stay behavior or “continuance
commitment” in Kanter’s (1968) terms. Continued exchange was treated
as another form of commitment behavior, and the analysis was identical
to that for gift giving and investment. The results are virtually identical
to those for gift giving. When all antecedent variables of the theory (fig.
3) plus profit differences are controlled, there are two significant effects:
a positive effect for perceived group cohesion (b p .21; P ! .05) and a
positive direct effect for exchange frequency (b p . 31; P ! .01). The first
is consistent with relational-cohesion theory and with previous research
(Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). The second is a common residual effect
for exchange frequency that tends to show up consistently in related
research (see Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996). The investment form of com-
mitment behavior stands out as the only form not affected by group
cohesion.
One important difference in this study is that the investment decision
involved an N-person prisoner’s dilemma game, whereas dyadic research
involved a two-person prisoner’s dilemma. It is well known that coop-
eration is harder to generate in the former. The implication of these results,
however, is that different social processes may be producing different
forms of commitment behavior. For example, there could be dual processes
operating to produce commitment: an expressive one captured by gift
giving and an instrumental one captured by a propensity to invest in a
social dilemma. In the following section, we consider this possibility.
A Modified Model
To consider if a dual process operates, we examined a modified model
with a direct path from perceived predictability to investment behavior
(see table 3). Adding this path was a reasonable alternative specification,
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TABLE 3
Standardized Lisrel Estimates of the Causal Paths in the
Modified Model: Triads
Independent AF PE PR GC Gift Investment
High total power (HT) . . . . . . . .33** . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equal power (EQ) . . . . . . . . . . . . .21* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Agreement frequency (AF) . . . . . . .58*** .24** . . . .24** .22**
Positive emotion (PE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77*** . . . . . .
Predictability (PR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 . . . .30**
Group cohesion (GC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33*** 2.12
R2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .06 .34 .06 .64 .24 .13
x2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284.90
Note.—N p 128. For x2, P p .00; df p 197. Goodness of fit p .84; Lewis-Tucker fit index p .95;
comparative fit index p .96.
* P ! .05, one-tailed tests.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
given research on uncertainty by other exchange theorists (see Cook and
Emerson 1984; Kollock 1994) and also because modification indices sug-
gested such a path. We chose to add two other direct paths as well: one
from exchange frequency to gift giving and one from exchange frequency
to investment behavior. Previous research has shown residual (and pos-
itive) direct effects from exchange frequency to commitment behavior,
though these have not always reached significance (e.g., Lawler and Yoon
1993, 1996), and again the modification indices suggested these paths. All
three of these new paths attained a conservative significance level of at
least P ! .01 in the modification indices.
The revised model with these additional links is in figure 5. The most
important finding is the direct path from predictability to investment
behavior (b p .30; P ! .01). This is theoretically interesting because a
positive impact here can be interpreted in terms of perceived trust, defined
as a general expectation of cooperation (Pruitt and Kimmel 1977). Before
trust can emerge between two individuals, each must view the other as
predictable. In this sense, predictability is an essential condition for the
development of trust. If indeed predictability and trust are related in this
way, and trust is necessary for investment in a social dilemma situation,
then we would expect a positive significant path between predictability
and investment behavior, as we observe.
Turning to the direct effects from exchange frequency to gift giving,
and from exchange frequency to investment, we have speculated in the
past that this may reflect the uncertainty reduction process, but since
uncertainty reduction is measured and controlled here, there must be
Fig. 5.—Results from the refined model. *P ! .05; **P ! .01.
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another mechanism at work. One plausible interpretation is that this is
a noncognitive reinforcement process. Said differently, actors who are
rewarded for exchanging in the first 12 episodes may tend to repeat these
cooperative behaviors, in the form of various commitment behaviors. If
social reinforcement processes are operating, above and beyond other
processes in the theory, then we would expect to see direct effects between
exchange frequency and commitment behaviors, and we do.
It is important to note that while three new paths were added, there
were no major changes to any of the original paths. The results, therefore,
reveal a dual commitment process: (1) an affective process that generates
symbolic forms of commitment such as gift giving (Lawler and Yoon 1996),
and (2) an uncertainty reduction process (Kollock 1994) that generates
more willingness to risk cooperative behavior in an N-person social di-
lemma. Actors give more gifts to each other when successful exchange
makes them feel good and when they perceive an emerging feeling of
unity among members. Investment behavior, on the other hand, requires
trust in exchange partners (Kollock 1994), especially in an N-person di-
lemma, and this is reflected in the impact that frequent exchange has on
perceived predictability and that perceived predictability has on invest-
ment. These results suggest parallel instrumental and expressive group
formation processes.
A Comparison to Previous Research
Because the procedures of experiments in Lawler and Yoon (1996) are
nearly identical, except for the context (i.e., person-to-person negotiated
vs. person-to-group productive exchange), we have the opportunity to
explore differences between dyadic negotiated exchange and triadic pro-
ductive exchange across experiments. Overall, we would expect exchange
frequencies to be lower in triadic productive exchange due to coordination
problems, and this in turn should be manifest in lower levels of positive
emotion, predictability, cohesion, gift giving, and investment behavior.
To test for such effects, we conducted t-tests for two samples comparing
the grand means for the dyad and triad experiments. The results, in table
4, reveal patterns in the expected direction across nearly all the theoretical
variables. In the case of behavioral variables, the exchange frequency in
triadic productive exchange was roughly two-thirds of that observed in
dyadic negotiated exchange; fewer gift opportunities were used in triads
than dyads; and fewer contributions or investments also were made in
triads than dyads. These comparisons affirm that cohesion and commit-
ment are more problematic in the multiactor productive context than in
the negotiated dyadic context. In the case of emotion and cohesion, both
forms of positive emotion are significantly lower in triadic than in dyadic
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TABLE 4
t-test of the Key Variables between the Dyad and Triad Study
Variable Mean for Dyads Mean for Triads t-test (Dyad-Triad)
Agreement frequency . . . . . . . . .62 .42 9.59***
(.20) (.19)
Pleasure/satisfaction . . . . . . . . . 5.56 5.19 2.64**
(1.28) (1.34)
Interest/excitement . . . . . . . . . . . 6.34 6.11 2.17*
(.98) (.99)
Positive emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.95 5.65 2.76**
(1.01) (1.00)
Relational/group cohesion . . . 5.12 5.01 .94
(.91) (1.15)
Gift exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 .32 5.56***
(.20) (.14)
Investment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 .36 3.33***
(.27) (.21)
Note.—The number of cases for the variables gift giving and investment are 64 and 80, respectively,
for the dyad study and the triad study. Gift exchange and investment for both studies are measured
as the ratio of exchanged gifts or contributed investments out of the total possible chances. SDs are
given in parentheses. N p 240 for dyads; N p 128 for triads.
* P ! .05, one-tailed tests.
** P ! .01.
*** P ! .001.
exchange, as we expected, while the difference in perceived cohesion is
in the correct direction but not significant. In sum, the triadic productive
structure generated lower exchange frequencies, lower levels of positive
feeling, but about the same level of perceived cohesion.
We also analyzed for changes over time, comparing the first and second
administrations of the questionnaire. In triadic productive exchange,
exchange frequency (mean p .30–.53; t p 10.44; P ! .001); pleasure/
satisfaction (mean p 4.2–5.2; t p 7.47; P ! .001), and group cohesion
(mean p 4.40–5.01; t p 5.81; P ! .001) were all higher after episode 12
than after episode 6. In fact, among the theoretical variables, only interest/
excitement failed to increase from the first to the second part of the ex-
periment. In dyadic negotiated exchange, differences across time did not
occur; only small differences were observed across time (mean p 5.9–.65
for exchange frequency; 5.3–6.3 for pleasure/satisfaction; 5.5–6.3 for in-
terest/excitement). The upshot is that the endogenous process tends to
become stronger over time in multiactor productive exchange, whereas
in dyadic negotiated exchange, the levels of exchange frequency, emotion,
and cohesion were established early and then maintained.
Overall, these exploratory and rather global comparisons of our triadic
research here with dyadic exchange in previous research (Lawler and
Yoon 1996) have two general implications. First, cohesion and commit-
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ment are more problematic in multiactor productive exchange than in
dyadic negotiated exchange, and this is manifest in less pleasure/satis-
faction and lower rates of commitment behavior. Second, the exchange-
to-emotion-to-cohesion process specified by the theory tends to start lower
and grow in strength over time in the multiactor productive case, whereas
a stable level is reached more quickly in the dyadic negotiated case.
DISCUSSION
Overview
This research was undertaken with two primary objectives: first, to extend
the theory of relational cohesion to multiactor, productive exchange in
which three actors have an incentive to negotiate a joint venture; second,
to test two alternative explanations for the development of group com-
mitment in productive exchange—uncertainty reduction and positive
emotion. Both questions address how it is that commitment and rudi-
mentary group formation, involving person-to-group attachments (Kanter
1968; Hall 1988), emerge from repeated exchange among multiple actors.
We propose that productive exchange generates group attachments by
focusing actors’ attention on the collective nature of their task and through
the joint responsibility they have for success or failure at exchange.
As far as we know, this is the first study explicitly concerned with
productive exchange. Productive exchange is characterized by higher de-
grees of mutual interdependence than other forms of exchange
—negotiated, reciprocal, and generalized (see Molm 1994; Molm and Cook
1995). The rational course in productive exchange is to transact, and the
main obstacle is coordination (Schelling 1960). In other words, productive
exchange strengthens the cooperative elements and weakens the com-
petitive elements of a mixed-motive context, primarily because of the
underlying interdependencies that characterize this form of exchange. Re-
lational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996) can elaborate the
consequences of this structure.
The main results of this research generally support predictions from
relational-cohesion theory. First of all, total or average dependence on the
group (i.e., sum of each person’s group dependence) and equal, rather
than unequal, dependence increase the frequency of productive exchange;
these effects occur even though individuals do not know others’ power
position and therefore cannot compare their own dependence on the group
to the others’ (see Cook et al. [1983] and Markovsky, Willer, and Patton
[1988] for similar structural effect in exchange networks). Second, as re-
vealed by earlier studies of negotiated exchange, more frequent productive
exchange generates positive emotions that, in turn, enhance perceptions
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of group cohesion. Exchange frequency also has the predicted positive
effects on the perceived predictability of negotiations with the others, but
contrary to the theory, predictability does not enhance perceived group
cohesion. Third, as predicted, greater perceived cohesion increases com-
mitment behavior for gift-giving to other members and also for continuing
to exchange with them (staying). Greater cohesion, however, does not
enhance the propensity of group members to invest in a more risky joint
venture that could lead to malfeasance or exploitation by the others.
Dual Processes of Commitment
Our findings point to an important departure from the theory that war-
rants attention. Specifically, despite evidence that more frequent exchange
increases the perceived predictability, predictability does not increase per-
ceptions of group cohesion. This calls into question the hypothesized me-
diating role of uncertainty reduction. One plausible interpretation is that
there are dual processes promoting commitment to groups, manifest in
different commitment behaviors. That is, different forms of commitment
behavior may be produced through different mediating steps or processes.
In support of this idea, our data reveal that the relational-cohesion
process occurs for gift giving and for continuing exchange (stay behavior),
whereas investments in a new joint venture (i.e., a social dilemma) are
generated by uncertainty reduction, but not through group cohesion. This
suggests that a trust process may be operating to produce commitment
in addition to the emotional/affective process. Exchange-theoretic analyses
of uncertainty reduction, in fact, tend to treat trust as a key mediating
condition for uncertainty reduction. As uncertainties about the others are
reduced, predictions about when they will or will not cooperate develop
a firmer foundation, that is, there is an increase in “expectations of co-
operation by others” (Pruitt and Kimmel 1977; Yamagishi 1995; Kramer
and Tyler 1996). Predictability and trust are not one and the same, because
others may be predictably unreliable, malevolent, or untrustworthy.
Nevertheless, the causal chain we observe (exchange frequency r per-
ceptions of predictability r investment in a social dilemma) can be in-
terpreted as a perceived-trust mechanism that is distinct from an emotion-
based group formation mechanism. In this sense, our research tends to
suggest dual processes through which person-to-group commitments de-
velop in multiactor, productive exchange. This is also suggested by con-
ceptual differences between the gift giving and investment forms of com-
mitment behavior.
Gift giving can be construed as the most expressively based form of
commitment behavior and investment behavior as the most instrumen-
tally based. In our theory and related experiments, gifts involved little
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cost and could not be used instrumentally. They were simple, token ges-
tures. Investment behavior entails the possibility of malfeasance, because
the costs are significant if one invests but others do not. Being able to
predict what the others will do is more important for investment than
gift giving, simply because there is more at stake. It theoretically follows
that trust would be crucial here. Thus, we suggest that actors who suc-
cessfully exchange are prepared to engage in symbolic, expressive behavior
toward others sooner than they are willing to take action involving sub-
stantial risk. The former requires positive feelings from interaction with
the others and a sense of a cohesive group, while the latter requires
sufficient trust. The dual process observed in our results highlights the
importance of distinguishing instrumental and expressive kinds of com-
mitment and adds conceptual support for the importance of trust for the
former.
The fact that perceived predictability does not affect group cohesion
also raises questions about the “boundary defining” role we attributed to
uncertainty reduction and whether there are any conditions under which
uncertainty reduction will have group formation effects. We argued that
as the focal set of actors becomes more predictable, they are cognitively
“set off” from others with whom an individual is less familiar. This os-
tensibly makes the focal group appear more “distinctive” and satisfies a
condition known to facilitate group formation. We find no evidence for
such an effect. However, our experimental procedures could have made
it difficult for differences in predictability between the focal and alter-
native group to occur. When an agreement did not occur in the focal
group, there was no uncertainty about whether an agreement with the
alternative group would occur (i.e., it was automatic), and there was no
negotiation process with the members of the alternative group (i.e., it was
simulated). The distinctiveness effect may be most likely to occur when
differences in the predictability of groups are substantial and salient.
Under such conditions, we would expect uncertainty reduction to have
group formation as well as trust effects. Future research should address
this possibility.
Exchange and Group Identity
A fundamental point of our theorizing and research is to suggest that
multiactor productive exchange has group formation effects. Broadly such
effects can be cast in terms of commonalties between social exchange
theory and a very different theoretical tradition, social identity theory. In
social exchange theory (Molm and Cook 1995), interdependencies moti-
vate exchanges, whereas in social identity theory and research (Tajfel and
Turner 1986; Brewer 1993), interdependencies generate a sense of group-
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ness among actors. The latter is often termed “psychological group for-
mation” (Rabbie and Horowitz 1988; Kramer 1991, 1993). Psychological
group formation essentially involves individual commitments to the group
(person-to-group attachments) that are manifest in collectively oriented
behavior on behalf of the group and toward its members, for example,
more favorable, cooperative, or generous behavior. Overall, social
exchange theory emphasizes how interdependence leads to instrumental
acts and behaviors, and social identity theory emphasizes how interde-
pendence leads to symbolic or expressive behaviors. From exchange the-
ory, “generous” behavior must be connected to an actor’s self interest in
some way, whereas from social identity theory, a rudimentary common
group identity or affiliation is sufficient to produce such behavior toward
other group members (see also Collins 1981, 1989).
This convergence between social exchange and social identity helps
us to analyze how and when repeated exchange results in social units
that are formed on a cognitive level. If social identity theories are correct,
and there is much evidence to support their fundamental claims, then
repetitive exchange in the context of interdependence should be a basis
for the formation of relations and groups. Similar ideas can be found
in Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) analysis of “incipient institutionali-
zation” and also in Collins’s (1981) theory of interaction ritual chains.
Berger and Luckmann argue that it often takes only one repetition of
a behavior in interaction for the process of microinstitutionalization to
begin; and for Collins (1981), recurrent interaction among the same
actors is the microfoundation for macro order. Finally, Homans (1961)
indicates that frequent interaction is sufficient to generate positive sen-
timent in relations and that this is especially likely when actors have
alternative partners of less value than a focal relation or group, a con-
dition met here and in most research on social exchange (Willer et al.
1997). Whether or not one fully subscribes to these particular theoretical
viewpoints, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that in the
case of social exchange, mere frequency, repetition, or recurrence are
powerful forces that contain the seeds of social order and related phe-
nomena (e.g., group cohesion and commitment).
In a larger sense, the formation of a group from repeated exchange
involves the transformation of what starts as a purely instrumental, self-
oriented relationship into a partly expressive, collectively oriented social
unit. Relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996, 1998)
stipulates that people will become more strongly committed to groups
in which they experience positive feelings in interaction or exchange
with others. Emotions are the linchpin between frequent exchange and
group formation, and this is a key difference between our theory and
social identity. The emotion is not produced by “groupness” per se, but
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by the interaction of its members; furthermore, under conditions typical
of most exchanges (i.e., a joint task with joint responsibility for success
or failure), people attribute their task-induced feelings in part to relevant
social units (Weiner 1985). This makes the group salient as a positive
social object and promotes a collective orientation to the exchange task.
In this manner, the instrumental and the expressive are interwoven.
Our research can be construed as taking up the question of how
interdependence generates social order in the form of group cohesion
and commitment (Doreian and Fararo 1998; Durkheim 1933; Ekeh 1974;
Hechter 1987). Whether it is a corporation undertaking a merger/
acquisition, an academic department staving off the recruitment of fac-
ulty by other institutions, or a rotary club whose members have simply
lost interest, a fundamental problem is the commitment of members to
the group. Our research suggests that certain kinds of social interactions
contain basic ingredients to overcome the commitment problem. Spe-
cifically, when group members are interdependent on one another to
produce a single product that benefits all, two interrelated processes
work to promote instrumental and expressive forms of commitment.
The first operates through uncertainty and trust; the second operates
through positive emotion and relational cohesion. In the aforementioned
examples, our theory helps explain why corporate profit sharing, joint
research and teaching projects among faculty, and potluck dinners foster
commitment to the larger group. In each case, the production of a single
collective reward through joint activity triggers emotional and cognitive
processes that yield cohesion and commitment.
In conclusion, this article shows how cohesion and commitment can
develop in productive exchange contexts. The emotional/affective and
uncertainty reduction effects of successful exchanges are crucial to this,
and these are parallel processes that result in complementary kinds of
commitment. Under favorable total and relative power dependence con-
ditions, actors successfully negotiate repeated exchanges that unleash
dual processes resulting in commitment. Through an emotional/affective
mechanism, they come to define themselves as a group, ascribe value
to the group itself, and become more inclined to stay or continue with
the group and to give members token gifts. Through an uncertainty
reduction mechanism, they come to trust their exchange partners and
become more willing to partake in a ventures that entail risk of mal-
feasance. Together, these dual processes provide a more general, multi-
dimensional view of commitment and cohesion in networks and groups.
APPENDIX
The theory consists of two definitions and two axioms. Given each mem-
ber’s dependence on the group (D1, D2, D3, . . . , DN), the total dependence
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(TD) of N members on the group is defined as the average of individual
member’s dependence (see also Molm 1987).
N
TD p Di/N, TD 1 0.O
ip1
We define inequality of power dependence (DI) for the group as the
average difference of individual dependencies on the focal group.
N N
DI p FDi 2 DjF/NC , DI 1 0,OO 2
ip1 jp1
where C refers to a combination and NC2 is the total number of non-
overlapping pairs in a group of N persons. DI approaches 0 when all
members become equally dependent on the group.
In addition to these two concepts, the theory consists of two axioms.
The first axiom stipulates the relation of total dependence and dependence
inequality to structural cohesion in the group. The second axiom stipulates
the endogenous process of the theory of relational cohesion (see Lawler
and Yoon 1996).
Axiom 1.—SC p SC (TD, DI, INT).
SC 1 0, (A1)TD
SC ! 0, (A2)DI
SC ! 0, (A3)INT
where SCTD refers to the first partial derivative of structural cohesion (SC)
as a function of total dependence (TD), SCDI refers to the first partial
derivative of structural cohesion (SC) as a function of dependence in-
equality (DI), and SCINT refers to the first partial derivative for the multi-
plicative effect of dependence inequality and total dependence.
Axiom 2.—GC p GC (PE, PR); PR p PR (AF); PE p PE (AF); AF
p AF (SC).
GC 1 0, (A4)PE
GC 1 0, (A5)PR
PR 1 0, (A6)AF
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PE 1 0, (A7)AF
AF 1 0, (A8)SC
where GC, PE, PR, and AF refer to group cohesion, positive emotion,
predictability, and agreement frequency, respectively. The predictions
(paths) shown in figure 3 are derived from axiom 2 by replacing equation
(A8) in axiom 2 with equations (A1), (A2), and (A3) in axiom 1.
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